J Lentner writes:

I guess one could applaud ESPN for giving equal time to the traditionalists with , the first in a promised series on productive outs. What really makes his case for the productive out laughable is the accompanying box. Florida won the PO battle 9-5 yet was outscored 21-17. So the one cancels the other out and it comes down to the fact that the Yankees’ batters slumped and the Marlins’ pitchers excelled.

Off the top of my head, I’d assume that the teams winning in postseason that had a “edge in PO” were the ones that also had an edge in OBA, and therefore Buster Olney’s articlehad more opportunities to move runners over. Seems simple enough.

I should probably take an hour off from work to respond to this article. This is Elias playing politics. The Elias Sports Bureau cannot survive without the support of the leagues. What they see is themselves being made irrelevant by the likes of Billy Beane and Theo Epstein, who look to non-Elias people for information. If I'm an owner, I have to start asking why MLB is paying the Hirdts big money to keep stats, when others can do it as well and cheaper. So Elias has decided to appeal to all those GMs who think Beane is wrong.

The style of play that generates many of the Productive Outs - putting runners in motion, bunting - has been scrutinized by many baseball theorists in recent seasons. Some teams, most notably the Oakland Athletics, have played with the philosophy that a team's 27 outs should not be wasted.

This has worked for Oakland during the regular season: the Athletics averaged 98 regular-season victories from 2000-2003. During that time, they ranked 14th, 13th, 14th and 13th in the 14-team American League in stolen bases, and 12th, 13th, 13th and 13th in sacrifice bunts. Their base-runners proceeded carefully, taking care not to make a mistake that would effectively strip a teammate of a chance to swing the bat. Bunts, hit-and-run plays and aggressive secondary leads are not part of the Athletics' DNA.

Oakland has generated walks, something that other great teams had done before -- one of Gene Michael's primary goals when he began rebuilding the Yankees in 1990 was to increase on-base percentage -- with the goal of saturating the bases with runners and scoring more.

But this conservative style has not translated well in the post-season, when the pitching is markedly better, there are more off-days to rest the best pitchers, and the pressure is greater. Rather than concentrating on not wasting their 27 outs, most championship teams have successfully used their outs, working to put runners in scoring position.

I also get the feeling that Elias has rigged the definition to make the stat look good.

This is the Productive Out, as defined and developed by ESPN The Magazine and the Elias Sports Bureau: when a fly ball, grounder or bunt advances a runner with nobody out; when a pitcher bunts to advance a runner with one out (maximizing the effectiveness of the pitcher's at-bat), or when a grounder or fly ball scores a run with one out.

Doesn't that seem limited to you? I mean, if you move a runner into scoring position with two outs, doesn't that count for something? And besides, didn't Pete Palmer show 20 years ago that trading an out for a base always decreases run potential?

I'm going to write more on this later, but I'll leave you with two themes I've hit upon all year; getting on base is important, and putting the ball in play is important.
Clarification: Chris Lynch thinks I'm not being clear with this statement:

I mean, if you move a runner into scoring position with two outs, doesn't that count for something?

I meant the play ends with two outs (begins with one out).